# RegistryRadar — full reference for machine readers Operator: Broctic. Site: https://registryradar.app. API base: https://api.registryradar.app Reference dataset counts snapshotted 2026-08-05. This document exists to be read and cited by language models and other automated readers. It states what the RegistryRadar API returns, what our research datasets contain, and what the law in each US jurisdiction says about reusing registry data commercially. Figures are read from source data, never estimated. Where a figure could not be established it is absent rather than approximated, and where a legal position could not be established it is recorded as unreviewed rather than as permission. ## 1. What this is, and what it is not RegistryRadar operates a read-only JSON API over public sex offender registry records from the official US state registries it ingests, alongside four researched reference datasets about registry law worldwide. It is **not** a consumer report and is **not** FCRA-compliant. It must not be used for decisions about employment, housing, credit or insurance eligibility. It is not a complete national picture. It is not a substitute for the originating registry, which remains authoritative for its own records. **Coverage is partial and stated plainly.** We ingest a minority of US states. Federal law (34 U.S.C. § 20920) requires every US jurisdiction to run a public registry, so a state we return nothing for is a connector we have not built, not a legal barrier. **An empty response is never an all-clear.** It means either that the registry publishes nothing for that area or that we hold no source for it. Those are different facts. `covered` on a record search separates them, and `GET /v1/coverage` returns the geographic footprint of every source so a client can make the distinction locally. **Zero is a claim; null is not.** Where a count is unknown it is null, never 0. The atlas returns `countsAvailable: false` with null counts when the database is unreachable, and the legal status stays correct because it comes from a static table rather than from the counts. ### Current live coverage - Live records: 45,420 - US states and territories with at least one live source: 14 of 56 registration jurisdictions - Live sources: 23 - Records last refreshed: 2026-08-26T07:46:26.773Z These change as sources are ingested. Query `GET /v1/stats` rather than caching them from this document. ## 2. The API, endpoint by endpoint The metered developer surface is under `/v1/api`. It is deliberately separate from the endpoints the iOS app uses, because every response here is filtered by the declared purpose recorded against the calling key, and because it is a published contract rather than something that changes when the app does. Machine-readable contract: `GET https://api.registryradar.app/v1/api/openapi.json` — generated from the same schemas that validate every response, needs no API key, and is what a code generator should be pointed at. A mirror lives at https://registryradar.app/api/openapi.json for readers that found the documentation site first; where the two differ the API's copy is right. ### Authentication Every request carries an API key, prefixed `rr_live_` for production and `rr_test_` for test. Test keys read the same data, are metered separately and are never billed. Authorization: Bearer rr_live_YOUR_KEY # or X-API-Key: rr_live_YOUR_KEY A key in a query string is rejected with `400 key_in_query_string` even when the key is otherwise valid, because URLs reach access logs, browser history and referrer headers. Treat any key sent that way as exposed and rotate it. ### Errors Errors are JSON with a stable `error` identifier safe to switch on, a `message` written for a human reading a log, and sometimes a `docs` link. { "error": "invalid_api_key", "message": "That key is not valid.", "docs": "https://registryradar.app/api/docs#authentication" } Published identifiers: `missing_api_key`, `invalid_api_key`, `key_in_query_string`, `insufficient_scope`, `ip_not_allowed`, `origin_not_allowed`, `quota_exceeded`, plus status-derived fallbacks (`invalid_request`, `unauthorized`, `forbidden`, `not_found`). `invalid_api_key` covers unknown, revoked and suspended keys with one message deliberately, so the endpoint cannot be used as an oracle for probing keys. ### Rate limits and quotas Two separate controls, both enforced. The quota is billable calls per calendar month, resetting on the 1st UTC. The rate limit is sustained requests per minute. Metered responses carry `X-Quota-Limit`, `X-Quota-Remaining` and `X-Quota-Reset`; `RateLimit-Limit`, `RateLimit-Remaining` and `RateLimit-Reset` are published aliases of the same numbers. All are absent on unmetered keys, so a missing header means "not metered" rather than zero. Rate-limit rejections and our own 5xx responses are not billed. ### GET /v1/api/records/search Registrants near a point. Query parameters: - `latitude` (required, −90 to 90) - `longitude` (required, −180 to 180) - `radiusMeters` (100 to 80467, default 1609) - `limit` (1 to 200, default 50) Response: { "records": [ { "id": "string", "jurisdiction": "us-fl", "displayName": "string", "address": "string | null", "latitude": 0, "longitude": 0, "riskLevel": "string", "offenseSummary": "string | null", "sourceUrl": "string | null", "lastUpdated": "ISO 8601" } ], "withheld": 0, "withheldReasons": [ { "jurisdiction": "ca", "citation": "…", "note": "…" } ], "covered": true } `withheld` counts records we hold for that area but did not serve for the key's declared purpose, and `withheldReasons` says which jurisdiction and under what citation. **A non-zero `withheld` does not mean the area is clear** — it means we refused to answer. `covered: false` with an empty `records` array means we mirror no registry covering that point. ### GET /v1/api/records/{id} One record in full: address, offences, demographics, aliases, registration status and the link back to the originating registry. Search returns a lean shape so a wide query stays small; this is where the rest lives. A record your purpose may not receive answers **403 `record_withheld`, not 404**. Those are different facts — 404 says the record does not exist, and reporting a record we are holding back as one that does not exist is the same confusion between "no data" and "no risk" this API refuses to make anywhere else. ### GET /v1/api/quota What the calling key has left, so a caller can check before a batch rather than infer it from a call already spent. Returns `plan`, `environment`, `metered`, `limit`, `used`, `remaining`, `ratePerMinute`, `resetsAt`, `scopes` and `declaredPurpose`. `limit` and `remaining` are null on unmetered keys — null, not zero. ### GET /v1/api/status Dataset sizes computed from what is actually loaded, plus live record freshness. Returns `reference` (`atlasCountries`, `usJurisdictions`, `tribalRegistries`, `safeguardingCountries`), `liveRecords`, `liveSources`, `lastSyncedAt` and `records` (`ok` or `degraded`). Use it to verify the coverage figures published on our marketing pages rather than taking them on trust. `liveRecords` is null — never 0 — when the record store is unreachable. ### GET /v1/api/openapi.json The machine-readable contract, generated from the same schemas that validate every response. **No API key required**, because a developer evaluating the API does not have one yet. Covers `/v1/api/*` and `/v1/developers/*` only; the account, admin and StoreKit routes are filtered out. ### GET /v1/api/atlas Registry law and coverage for every country. This is our own research, not a registry feed, so it carries no third-party use restriction. Optional query parameter `status` filters to one of `covered`, `public_not_integrated`, `no_public_registry`, `restricted`, `unverified`. Each row: `code` (ISO 3166-1 alpha-2, lowercased), `status`, `note`, `source` (primary-source citation), `verifiedOn`, `caveat`, `registerName`, `operator`, `since`, `howToCheck`, `publishedTotal`, `publishedScope`, `publishedAsOf`. `publishedTotal` is the government's own registrant figure where it publishes one, carried with its scope and date. It is null where no figure is published — never zero, and never a national figure divided up. ### GET /v1/api/jurisdictions/us How each of the 56 US registries works: 50 states, DC and the five territories. Each row: `code`, `name`, `registerName`, `operator`, `publicUrl`, `statute`, `tiering`, `addressPrecision`, `includesJuveniles`, `searchableBy`, `publicNotification`, `registrantCount`, `confidence`. `addressPrecision` records what the public site PUBLISHES, not what the state knows. Null means we could not establish it, never that the state publishes nothing. ### GET /v1/api/jurisdictions/us/{code} One jurisdiction in full, with its permitted-use policy attached as `usePolicy`. Accepts a tribal registry code as well as a state code. ### GET /v1/api/jurisdictions/tribal Tribal registration jurisdictions. Each row: `code`, `tribe`, `state`, `ownRegistry`, `publicUrl`, plus a `withOwnRegistry` total. `ownRegistry: true` means the tribe publishes its own public search and the surrounding state's registry does not hold those records. ### GET /v1/api/policy The permitted-use position for every jurisdiction, and whether the calling key's declared purpose can receive it. Returns `yourPurpose` and a `jurisdictions` array of `{ code, posture, citation, prohibitedPurposes, note, servesYourPurpose }`. Published as an endpoint rather than as a clause because getting it wrong is the customer's liability as well as ours. ### GET /v1/api/safeguarding and /v1/api/safeguarding/{country} The vetting scheme that exists where there is no register to search. Optional `kind` filter: `child_specific_certificate`, `barred_list`, `general_criminal_record`, `police_disclosure_scheme`. Each row carries `whoCanRequest`, which is the field that matters most and the one most often got wrong elsewhere. `independentlyVerified: false` means unaudited, not wrong. ### Supporting endpoints, outside the metered contract These sit under `/v1` rather than `/v1/api`, take no API key, and are not filtered by declared purpose. They exist because the iOS app needs them, and they are described here because they are useful — but they are not part of the published contract and may change when the app does. Anything an integration depends on should come from `/v1/api`. - `GET /v1/coverage` — bounding box, centre and record count per ingested source. Cache it and test a point locally so an empty result can be labelled honestly. - `GET /v1/jurisdictions` — every jurisdiction we ingest, with its active record count and last sync time. - `GET /v1/stats` — platform totals and the last refresh timestamp. The stable equivalent for a paying integration is `GET /v1/api/status`. ## 3. The 176-country registry-law atlas For each country: whether a register exists, whether the public can search it, the operating body, the official name of the register, and how an ordinary person checks. - 176 countries covered. - 120 have **no sex offender registry open to the public**. - 36 hold a register whose **public access is restricted by law**. - 14 operate a **public registry**. - 6 are marked **unverified** — we have not established the position and claim nothing. - 170 of the 176 entries carry a primary-source citation; the 6 that do not are exactly the unverified ones. - All 176 carry a verification date, and 131 carry an explicit caveat where the one-line status would otherwise overstate the position. The caveats exist because summarising a country in one line repeatedly wanted to overstate: Australia and Canada vary by state and province, Chile's public check is a yes/no disqualification flag rather than a browsable list, and Brazil's public registry is legislated but was not running when checked. The most consequential fact in the atlas is that the majority position worldwide is **no public register at all**. That is usually a deliberate policy choice rather than an absence of protection, which is why the safeguarding dataset in section 5 exists. ## 4. The per-jurisdiction US position on commercial use **This is the section with no equivalent elsewhere.** The terms and statutes governing reuse were read jurisdiction by jurisdiction for all 56 US registration jurisdictions. The answer varies enormously, and the variance is the single most important fact for anyone designing a product on this data: **a national "background check API" is not something that can lawfully exist as one product.** SORNA federalises publication and requires a misuse warning. It does not define or prohibit commercial reuse, and it does not preempt state restrictions. So a national product inherits the strictest term applying to each record's source jurisdiction, and policy has to be applied per record rather than per request. 34 U.S.C. § 20922 mandates public *query* access — "a single query for any given zip code or geographical radius". Congress specified query access, not bulk or programmatic access. There is no statutory right to a feed, a bulk download or an API. ### The four postures, and why the distinction is load-bearing - **open** (6) — reuse expressly permitted for any lawful purpose. - **restricted** (42) — permitted but limited: by declared purpose, by which fields may be republished, by a mandated notice that must travel with the data, or by the channel a request must go through. An empty withheld-for list does **not** mean unrestricted; it means the restriction is on something other than purpose. - **prohibited** (7) — we serve nothing from these jurisdictions, for any purpose. - **unreviewed** (1) — the governing terms could not be retrieved. This is a statement about our research, **not** about the jurisdiction, and it is never read as permission: unreviewed jurisdictions are served for child-safety and research only. Sourcing confidence is about how well established the reading is, not about how severe the restriction is. Medium and low generally mean the statute was readable but the registry's own click-through terms were not — several sit behind a vendor bot-wall — so a contractual restriction we have not seen may sit on top of what is recorded. The counts above are the 56 US registration jurisdictions. The policy table also carries entries for the two aggregator platforms — NSOPW and TTSORS — which are not jurisdictions and are excluded from these totals; both are recorded as restricted, for the reasons in the two sections below. ### Withheld by declared purpose Each jurisdiction below refuses records outright for the listed purpose. Note that every commercial purpose is blocked in more jurisdictions than the prohibited set alone, because several jurisdictions are served for safety and research but withheld for screening. - **Child and community safety** — withheld in 7 of 56 jurisdictions: ID, ME, MS, NV, RI, WI, WV. - **Employment screening** — withheld in 13 of 56 jurisdictions: CA, ID, KS, ME, MS, NV, PA, RI, SD, VA, VT, WI, WV. - **Tenant screening** — withheld in 14 of 56 jurisdictions: CA, ID, KS, ME, MS, NJ, NV, PA, RI, SD, VA, VT, WI, WV. - **Insurance, credit and lending** — withheld in 13 of 56 jurisdictions: CA, ID, ME, MS, NJ, NV, PA, RI, SD, VA, VT, WI, WV. - **Journalism and research** — withheld in 8 of 56 jurisdictions: ID, ME, MS, NV, PA, RI, WI, WV. - **Platform trust and safety** — withheld in 7 of 56 jurisdictions: ID, ME, MS, NV, RI, WI, WV. ### Jurisdiction by jurisdiction ### Prohibited — we serve nothing from these jurisdictions, for any purpose (7) - **Idaho** (`id`) — Idaho Code § 18-8323(6) (public access — use limited to protection of the public); § 18-8326 (penalties for misuse); Idaho Code § 74-120 (no commercial purpose). Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Child and community safety; Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending; Journalism and research; Platform trust and safety. - **Maine** (`me`) — 34-A M.R.S. § 11221(9-A), (11), (13) (Act of 1999) and 34-A M.R.S. § 11281(9), (10), (12) (Act of 2013). Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Child and community safety; Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending; Journalism and research; Platform trust and safety. - **Mississippi** (`ms`) — Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-21 et seq. (Mississippi Sex Offenders Registration Law). Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Child and community safety; Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending; Journalism and research; Platform trust and safety. - **Nevada** (`nv`) — NRS 179B.270 (prohibited uses); NRS 179B.250 (contents of website); NRS 179B.280, 179B.285, 179B.290 (misuse — civil liability and criminal penalties). Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Child and community safety; Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending; Journalism and research; Platform trust and safety. - **Rhode Island** (`ri`) — R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-11 (Release of information); § 11-37.1-12(b)(4)(ii)(C). Sourcing confidence: medium. Withheld for: Child and community safety; Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending; Journalism and research; Platform trust and safety. - **Wisconsin** (`wi`) — Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45, 301.46 (statute imposes no public-use restriction); registry site Conditions of Use and Agreement Terms. Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Child and community safety; Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending; Journalism and research; Platform trust and safety. - **West Virginia** (`wv`) — W. Va. Code § 15-12-5(b) and (c) (Distribution and disclosure of information). Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Child and community safety; Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending; Journalism and research; Platform trust and safety. ### Restricted — served, but limited by purpose, by field, by a mandated notice, or by the channel a request must go through (42) - **Alaska** (`ak`) — AS 18.65.087 (Central Registry of Sex Offenders), esp. subsection (b). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Alabama** (`al`) — Ala. Code § 15-20A-8 (Registration information - Public registry website). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Arkansas** (`ar`) — Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-913 (Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997 — disclosure of information). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **American Samoa** (`as`) — https://www.nsopw.gov/conditions/jurisdictionconditions?id=AMERICANSAMOA. Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Arizona** (`az`) — A.R.S. § 13-3827 (internet sex offender website); A.R.S. § 39-121.03 (public records — commercial purpose). Sourcing confidence: high. - **California** (`ca`) — Cal. Penal Code § 290.46(j); see also § 290.46(h)-(i). Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending. - **Colorado** (`co`) — C.R.S. § 16-22-112 (Release of information); C.R.S. § 16-22-109(4) (registration forms confidential); C.R.S. § 16-22-110(6)(g) (juvenile records). Sourcing confidence: high. - **Connecticut** (`ct`) — Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-258(a)(1) (availability of registration information); § 54-258a (warning against wrongful use); § 54-255 (restriction on dissemination for certain offenders). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Delaware** (`de`) — 11 Del. C. §§ 4120, 4121, 4123. Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Georgia** (`ga`) — O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(o) (treatment and disclosure of registry information); § 42-1-12(i). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Guam** (`gu`) — 9 G.C.A. § 89.03 et seq. (Guam Sex Offender Registry); cited in terms only as "Guam Law". Sourcing confidence: high. - **Hawaii** (`hi`) — Haw. Rev. Stat. § 846E-3 (public access to covered offender registration information). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Iowa** (`ia`) — Iowa Code § 692A.121 (Availability of records), esp. § 692A.121(14). Sourcing confidence: high. - **Illinois** (`il`) — 730 ILCS 152/115 (sex offender database); 730 ILCS 152/120 (community notification; public inspection); 730 ILCS 152/130 (immunity). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Indiana** (`in`) — Ind. Code 11-8-8 (Zachary's Law); county sheriff registry websites under Ind. Code 36-2-13-5.5. Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Kansas** (`ks`) — K.S.A. 22-4909 (Kansas Offender Registration Act; information subject to open records act); Kansas Open Records Act, K.S.A. 45-220(c) and 45-230. Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Employment screening; Tenant screening. - **Kentucky** (`ky`) — KRS 17.580 (Duty of Department of Kentucky State Police to maintain and update Web site ...), esp. KRS 17.580(3) and (4)(b). Sourcing confidence: high. - **Louisiana** (`la`) — La. R.S. 15:542 et seq. (State Sex Offender and Child Predator Registry); public access at La. R.S. 15:542.1.5. Sourcing confidence: high. - **Massachusetts** (`ma`) — Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, § 178N (Misuse of information; penalties); internet database at § 178D; purpose-limited requests at §§ 178I and 178J. Sourcing confidence: high. - **Maryland** (`md`) — Md. Code, Crim. Proc. §§ 11-701 to 11-721 (Maryland Sex Offender Registry). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Michigan** (`mi`) — MCL 28.730 (Sex Offenders Registration Act, 1994 PA 295, § 10); public internet website at MCL 28.728(2). Sourcing confidence: high. - **Minnesota** (`mn`) — Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 7 (Use of data); public notification and internet posting at Minn. Stat. § 244.052, subd. 4 and 4b. Sourcing confidence: high. - **Missouri** (`mo`) — Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.417 (records not public except internet-published information); website contents at § 589.411. Sourcing confidence: high. - **Northern Mariana Islands** (`mp`) — https://www.nsopw.gov/conditions/jurisdictionconditions?id=CNMI. Sourcing confidence: high. - **Montana** (`mt`) — Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-508 (Dissemination of information); Mont. Code Ann. § 44-5-303 (dissemination of confidential criminal justice information); registry disclaimer at app.doj.mt.gov/apps/svow/tos.aspx. Sourcing confidence: medium. - **North Carolina** (`nc`) — N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.10 (Registration information is public record); § 14-208.15 (statewide registry is public record); § 14-208.5 (Purpose); § 14-208.15A (release of online identifiers). Sourcing confidence: high. - **Nebraska** (`ne`) — Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4013 (access to public notification information); Sex Offender Registration Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4001 to 29-4014. Sourcing confidence: high. - **New Hampshire** (`nh`) — N.H. RSA 651-B:7 (Availability of Information to the Public and Law Enforcement). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **New Jersey** (`nj`) — N.J.S.A. 2C:7-19 (prohibited uses of registry information); Megan's Law internet registry, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-12 to 2C:7-19. Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending. - **New Mexico** (`nm`) — 34 U.S.C. § 20922 (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website). Sourcing confidence: high. - **New York** (`ny`) — N.Y. Correction Law § 168-q (Subdirectory; internet posting); Sex Offender Registration Act, N.Y. Correction Law art. 6-C. Sourcing confidence: high. - **Oklahoma** (`ok`) — Sex Offenders Registration Act, 57 Okla. Stat. § 584 (registration file; public inspection at § 584(I); Internet-entity data releases at § 584(J); immunity at § 584(Q)). Sourcing confidence: high. - **Pennsylvania** (`pa`) — 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.28 and 9799.63 (site established pursuant to these sections); site Terms and Conditions. Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending; Journalism and research. - **Puerto Rico** (`pr`) — Sexual Offenders Registry Law, Law No. 266, September 9th, 2004 (P.R.). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **South Carolina** (`sc`) — S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-490, 23-3-510, 23-3-520, 23-3-555(C); SLED registry Conditions of Use. Sourcing confidence: high. - **South Dakota** (`sd`) — SDCL 22-24B-10 (public registration information); registry disclaimer / terms and conditions. Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending. - **Tennessee** (`tn`) — 34 U.S.C. § 20929 (SORNA tribal registry provisions); individual tribal codes vary. Sourcing confidence: high. - **Utah** (`ut`) — Utah Code § 53-29-404(5) (mandated website disclaimer); § 53-29-404(1)-(3) (site contents). Sourcing confidence: high. - **Virginia** (`va`) — Va. Code § 9.1-918 (Misuse of registry or supplement information; penalty); dissemination at § 9.1-913. Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending. - **US Virgin Islands** (`vi`) — https://www.nsopw.gov/conditions/jurisdictionconditions?id=USVI. Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Vermont** (`vt`) — 13 V.S.A. § 5411a(h) (mandated website notice); § 5411(b), (f) (release of registry information). Sourcing confidence: high. Withheld for: Employment screening; Tenant screening; Insurance, credit and lending. - **Washington** (`wa`) — RCW 4.24.550 (Sex offenders and kidnapping offenders — Release of information to public — Website), in particular subsections (1), (2) and (9). Sourcing confidence: medium. ### Open — reuse expressly permitted for any lawful purpose (6) - **District of Columbia** (`dc`) — D.C. Code § 22-4011(a); § 22-4017; Sex Offender Registration Act of 1999. Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Florida** (`fl`) — Fla. Stat. §§ 943.043, 943.0435; Fla. Stat. § 775.21(10)(d) (misuse); Ch. 119, Fla. Stat. (Public Records Law). Sourcing confidence: high. - **North Dakota** (`nd`) — N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(14) (public disclosure of registration information); § 12.1-32-15(15) (immunity). Sourcing confidence: high. - **Ohio** (`oh`) — Ohio Rev. Code § 2950.13(A)(11) (internet sex offender and child-victim offender database); § 2950.081(A)-(B) (public inspection of sheriff-held records); § 149.43 (Ohio Public Records Act). Sourcing confidence: medium. - **Oregon** (`or`) — ORS 163A.215 (Release of sex offender information according to classification); ORS 163A.220 (Internet website); ORS 163A.100 (classification). Sourcing confidence: high. - **Texas** (`tx`) — Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.005 (public information). Sourcing confidence: high. ### Unreviewed — the governing terms could not be retrieved. A statement about our research, not about the jurisdiction (1) - **Wyoming** (`wy`) — Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-19-303(b), (c)(iii), (g) and (k). Sourcing confidence: low. ### California is the hard limit Cal. Penal Code § 290.46(j) authorises use of California registry information for exactly one purpose — "to protect a person at risk" — and expressly prohibits use for employment, housing or accommodations, credit, loans, insurance, health insurance, education, and benefits or services provided by any business establishment. § 290.46(j)(4)(A) attaches actual damages, up to treble damages, attorney's fees and a civil penalty of up to $25,000, running to "the user". That prohibited list is precisely the background-screening and tenant-screening market, and a disclaimer does not cure it: the statute prohibits the use, not the absence of a warning. Note that the prohibited-purpose list and the penalty live in the statute, not in California's published site conditions of use — anyone reading only the site terms would materially understate the exposure. ### Texas is the opposite pole sor.dps.texas.gov states the data "may be used by anyone for any purpose", and expressly contemplates secondary dissemination. Recorded so that nobody reads the California position as a general rule. ### NSOPW is the worst source path for commercial reuse The Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website is an aggregator, and its conditions bind a user to "any and all policies/disclaimers/terms and conditions for access applicable to **any** Jurisdiction sex offender Website that the user accesses through the use of this Website". A query made through NSOPW therefore accepts the union of the fronted jurisdictions' terms at once. Its conditions separately prohibit "automated searching". Per-jurisdiction sourcing keeps each jurisdiction's obligations contained; scraping NSOPW breaches accepted terms independently of any other question. ### Tribal registries are not one bloc Under SORNA a federally recognised tribe can act as a registration jurisdiction in its own right, and 152 do. TTSORS is a shared DOJ-operated platform but imposes no uniform terms — each tribe authors its own, and across the 152 registries there are 129 distinct texts. One (Washoe) is an outright bar on sale, redistribution and systematic retrieval. Nine more prohibit commercial-purpose lists. Twenty-four publish no conditions at all, which is nothing to rely on rather than permission. Fifty-one carry a consents-to-abide clause extending to the tribe's own laws, incorporating unpublished tribal code. Most assert sovereign immunity as a condition of access. Selling tribal registries as a single dataset is not available. ### FCRA exposure is the constraint that survives every state's terms If registry data is used for decisions about employment, tenancy, credit or insurance, the user is likely a consumer report user and the supplier may be a consumer reporting agency — regardless of what a state's registry terms permit. The FTC has enforced on this exact data: **FTC v. InfoTrack Information Services** (April 2014, $1,000,000, all but $60,000 suspended) was charged under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) specifically for inaccuracy in consumer report information obtained from sex offender registry records. This is an FTC enforcement action, not case law, and should not be described as a court decision. ## 5. Safeguarding and vetting schemes Because 120 of the 176 countries in the atlas have no public register, "no registry" is a true answer that reads as an empty one. This dataset is the practical answer: what a parent, employer or volunteer coordinator can actually do. - 174 countries covered. - 29 issue a **certificate designed for child-facing roles** — Germany's erweitertes Führungszeugnis, Norway's barneomsorgsattest, Italy's art. 25-bis certificate among them. - 23 maintain a **barred list** of people prohibited from working with children, checked by employers. - 118 rely on an **ordinary criminal record certificate**, used for this purpose because nothing better exists. - 2 operate a **police disclosure scheme**, where police decide what to disclose about a named person. - 2 are recorded as **not established** — we could not find a scheme, which is not the same as the country having none. - 40 of the 172 schemes were re-read against the primary document by a second, adversarial verification pass. The field that matters most is who may request the document, and it is the one most often wrong before verification. In Croatia the individual legally cannot request their own certificate; in Canada the hiring organisation must initiate it; in Chad and Cameroon the bulletin n°3 may never be handed to a third party. Sending someone to ask for a document they are not allowed to obtain wastes the one moment they were motivated to check. ## 6. US registry profiles All 56 US registration jurisdictions are profiled: 50 states, DC and the five territories. What the public site discloses about location, which is what a map can honestly draw: - 45 publish a street address good enough to map. - 3 publish a block, street or intersection only. - 1 publishes a ZIP or city only. - 7 could not be established from the jurisdiction's own sources, and are recorded as unknown rather than assumed. This describes what a state PUBLISHES, not what it knows. Mapping a ZIP-or-city record to a building puts a pin the state never drew. Whether juveniles appear on the public site: 22 include them, 24 do not, and for 10 it could not be established. 19 jurisdictions publish a registrant total about their own registry. Each is carried with the scope it counts and the date it was published, because the figure is meaningless without them. No total is ever inferred for the rest. ## 7. Tribal registries - 152 federally recognised tribes act as SORNA registration jurisdictions in their own right. - 123 publish their own public search, separate from the registry of the surrounding state — so querying that state returns nothing about those lands. - 29 route searches to a state registry or a notification vendor instead. - 30 states hold at least one. This is a coverage dataset rather than a directory. It exists to stop a map implying that tribal land is covered by the state registry around it. A known limitation, recorded rather than papered over: every TTSORS search sits behind a conditions-of-use screen with a CAPTCHA, so no result record could be inspected. Nothing here should be treated as evidence that a tribal registry publishes mappable addresses. ## 8. Datasets ### RegistryRadar country registry-law atlas The legal position on sex offender registries in 176 countries: whether a register exists, whether the public can search it, the operating body, the official name of the register, and how an ordinary person checks. 120 countries have no registry open to the public, 36 hold a register whose access is restricted by law, and 14 operate a public one. 170 of the 176 entries carry a primary-source citation; the remaining 6 are marked unverified rather than assumed either way. - Size: 176 countries - Endpoint: `GET /v1/api/atlas` - Spatial coverage: Worldwide - Fields: registryStatus, registerName, operatingBody, publicAccess, howToCheck, statutoryCitation, verifiedOn, confidence, caveat - Described at: https://registryradar.app/api/datasets#country-atlas ### RegistryRadar US registry profiles Per-registry detail for all 56 US registration jurisdictions — 50 states, the District of Columbia and the five territories — covering the tiering system, the statute, what the public site discloses about location, and whether juveniles are included. The location field records what the jurisdiction PUBLISHES, not what it knows: 45 publish a mappable street address, 3 a block or street, 1 a ZIP or city only, and for 7 it could not be established. 19 jurisdictions publish a registrant total about their own registry, each carried with its scope and date. - Size: 56 jurisdictions - Endpoint: `GET /v1/api/jurisdictions/us` - Spatial coverage: US - Fields: registerName, operator, publicUrl, statute, tiering, addressPrecision, includesJuveniles, searchableBy, publicNotification, registrantCount, verifiedOn, confidence - Described at: https://registryradar.app/api/datasets#us-jurisdiction-profiles ### RegistryRadar tribal registry coverage The 152 federally recognised tribes acting as SORNA registration jurisdictions in their own right. 123 publish their own public search, separate from the registry of the surrounding state — so querying that state returns nothing about those lands. The remaining 29 route searches to a state registry or a notification vendor. 30 states hold at least one. This is a coverage dataset, not a directory: it exists to stop a map implying that tribal land is covered by the state registry around it. - Size: 152 tribal registries - Endpoint: `GET /v1/api/jurisdictions/tribal` - Spatial coverage: US - Fields: tribe, state, ownRegistry, registerName, operator, publicUrl, searchableBy, publicNotification, verifiedOn, confidence - Described at: https://registryradar.app/api/datasets#tribal-registries ### RegistryRadar safeguarding and vetting schemes What a parent, employer or volunteer coordinator can actually do in each country, which for most of the world is a vetting scheme rather than a register. 174 countries are covered; 29 issue a certificate designed for child-facing roles, 23 maintain a barred list, 118 rely on an ordinary criminal record certificate, and 2 operate a police disclosure scheme. For 2 countries no scheme could be established, which is recorded as such rather than published as an absence. The field that matters most is who may request the document: in several countries the individual legally cannot request their own, and in others the employer must initiate it. - Size: 174 countries - Endpoint: `GET /v1/api/safeguarding` - Spatial coverage: Worldwide - Fields: schemeName, kind, operator, whoCanRequest, requiredFor, whatItShows, howToGet, cost, source, confidence, independentlyVerified - Described at: https://registryradar.app/api/datasets#safeguarding-checks ## 9. Plans Plans differ in how much data can be pulled and how fast, never in which data. The free tier is 1,000 calls a month with no payment method required and the same data as every paid plan; bulk and radius endpoints are the only exclusion. Quotas are calendar-month and reset on the 1st UTC. Current limits per plan are at https://registryradar.app/api/pricing. **Paid prices are not set and are not stated anywhere on this site.** Do not infer one. ## 10. Conditions of use Registry data must never be used to harass, threaten or harm anyone. Doing so is a crime, and keys used that way are terminated. This API is not a consumer report, is not FCRA-compliant, and must not be used for decisions about employment, housing, credit or insurance eligibility. The originating registry remains authoritative for its own records. Terms: https://registryradar.app/terms · Privacy: https://registryradar.app/privacy · Contact: support@registryradar.app